Sidgwick, Origen, and the reconciliation of egoism and morality by Mulgan, Tim
 
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, X, 2008, 2, pp. 42-71 
 
Sidgwick, Origen, and the reconciliation of egoism and mo-
rality 
 
 
Tim Mulgan  
University of St. Andrews 
tpm6@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Many themes of late twentieth century ethics are prefigured in Sidgwick’s Method of 
Ethics. In particular, Sidgwick’s ‘Dualism of Practical Reason’ sets the scene for current 
debates over the demands of morality. Many philosophers agree that Sidgwick uncovers 
a deep and troubling conflict at the heart of utilitarian ethics. But Sidgwick’s own re-
sponse to that conflict is treated, not as a live philosophical option, but as a historical 
oddity. In the twenty-first century, few philosophers see the intimate connection be-
tween the dualism of practical reason and the investigation of psychic phenomena that 
played such a large role in Sidgwick’s life. The aim of this paper is to investigate Sidg-
wick’s own approach to the dualism of practical reason. Its general conclusion is that a 
non-dualistic morality demands less than a theistic religion, contrary to what Sidgwick 
worried - especially as concerns personal immortality and freedom. 
 
 
0. Setting the scene 
 
Sidgwick’s Method of Ethics prefigures many themes of modern ethics. His 
‘Dualism of Practical Reason’ sets the scene for current debates over the 
demands of morality. But Sidgwick’s own solution is treated, not as a live 
philosophical option, but as a historical oddity. One reason for suspicion of 
Sidgwick’s solution is its apparent affinity with traditional theism (al-
though, as Sidgwick himself makes clear, his solution requires at most a 
general religious premise, and not a specifically theist one1). This paper res-
urrects Sidgwick’s solution, and explores the connections and differences 
between the metaphysical needs of morality and those of theism. Drawing 
on a heretical Christian tradition going back to Origen in the third century, 
I argue that the metaphysical needs of theism are greater than usually sup-
posed; while the needs of utilitarianism are much more modest. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 507, note 1. (I owe this reference to Gianfranco 
Pellegrino.) 
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1.  Sidgwick’s Dilemma 
 
Henry Sidgwick was both the last of the great classical Utilitarians and the 
first modern moral philosopher. Unlike his predecessors Jeremy Bentham 
and J. S. Mill, Sidgwick takes moral skepticism very seriously, and asks 
whether morality could survive without religion.  This concern is both prac-
tical (Could a secular worldview play the social role of religion?), and theo-
retical (Does morality even make sense in the absence of religion?) Sidgwick 
is less optimistic than Bentham or Mill.  He believes that the decline of re-
ligion both undermines non-utilitarian moral theory, and leads to a crisis 
for utilitarianism.  
For Sidgwick, ethics must be based on reason, not on empirical observa-
tion. Sidgwick called his masterpiece The Methods of Ethics.  A method is a 
very general way of deciding what to do.  Methods give rise to more specific 
principles –  everyday moral rules.  Sidgwick isolates three possible methods 
of ethics: utilitarianism, egoism, and intuitionism.  For Sidgwick, the main 
opponents of utilitarianism are intuitionists, who believe in a “moral sense” 
giving us infallible knowledge of moral principles. (Sidgwick distinguishes 
dogmatic intuitionism – which he condemns – from philosophical intuition-
ism – his name for his own methodology.) 
 Sidgwick's first task is to demonstrate the superiority of utilitarianism to 
intuitionism.  If I had a moral sense, I would always know what to do. As I 
often do not know what I ought to do, I obviously do not have a moral 
sense. Indeed, no one has a moral sense. So the intuitionist method falls 
apart. This leaves two competing forms of hedonism: universalistic hedon-
ism (utilitarianism) and egoistic hedonism (egoism).  These tell me to 
maximise the general happiness and to maximise my own happiness.  Each 
method is an independently rational first principle.  Neither takes prece-
dence over the other.  Unless the universe is specifically designed to make 
the two methods coincide, they will often conflict in practice. Suppose I 
have ten dollars. I can maximize my own happiness by buying a movie 
ticket to see Gratuitous Violence IV, but if I were maximizing the general 
happiness I could certainly find a better use for the money. At this point, 
reason offers no further guidance. Sidgwick finds an irresolvable dualism at 
the heart of human reason. 
To a reader acquainted with contemporary moral philosophy, Sidgwick's 
dualism may seem analogous to the common objection that utilitarianism is 
extremely demanding.2 However, Sidgwick himself does not explicitly 
                                                 
2 For an introduction to this objection, see Mulgan, The Demands of Consequentialism. 
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worry about the demands of morality. Instead, he has a deeper point. His 
objection is not just that personal interest conflicts with the general good, 
or that utilitarianism is very demanding, or even that its demands are psy-
chologically impossible. Sidgwick finds a contradiction in practical reason, 
not just a moral difficulty.  Putting my own interests first is not just psy-
chologically natural – it is also completely rational and unobjectionable. A 
completely selfish person commits no rational error. 
For Sidgwick, the dualism of practical reason signals the failure of ethical 
theory.  Moral philosophy must reconcile the two methods.  This require-
ment is very strong, as contradiction is only avoided if every person's hap-
piness always coincides exactly with the general happiness. 
Sidgwick's dualism explains his enormous interest in psychic research.  
Individuals’ interests do not coincide in the present life. Life after death is 
certainly not sufficient to solve the dualism of practical reason. The next 
world might be as unjust as this world. However, life after death is neces-
sary for ethics.  Unless there is another life where justice might be done, the 
attempt to systematise ethics is hopeless.  Moral philosophers must examine 
the evidence that human beings can survive death. Sidgwick’s paranormal 
activities are thus not an eccentric side-line. They are central to his philoso-
phical concerns. 
The most familiar solution combines an afterlife with God – who ensures 
that happiness and morality coincide. Sidgwick agrees that this solution 
would be satisfactory. Unfortunately, we cannot be sure that God exists. As 
a result, Sidgwick’s own approach is more tentative. Indeed, he offers no 
real solution. He merely claims that any solution must involve an afterlife 
of some sort. 
Sidgwick's own approach to his own dualism has few contemporary fol-
lowers.  Utilitarians ignore the possibility that we survive death, and deny 
that utilitarianism is incoherent if we do not survive; while religious moral 
philosophy is strongly anti-utilitarian.  Sidgwick's problem has been much 
more influential in recent moral thought than his tentative solution.  
 
 
2.  Why twentieth century philosophy ignored Sidgwick 
 
In section 3, we see how the contemporary moral philosophical landscape is 
moving back to Sidgwick. The present section first shows how it moved 
away. 
The period from Moore’s Principia Ethica in 1903 to Rawls’s A theory of 
justice in 1971 was a dark age for normative ethics. The rise of philosophical 
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naturalism, especially in the extreme form of logical positivism, and the re-
jection of traditional metaphysics, undermined both Sidgwick's question 
and his answer. 
The linguistic turn in philosophy shifts attention from normative ethics 
to metaethics.3 Sidgwick's question was seldom asked. A new question be-
came central: How do ethical facts fit into a naturalistic world view?4  
Emotivists and prescriptivists say that there are no ethical facts. Sidgwick’s 
question thus becomes meaningless.5 Naturalists, by contrast, identify ethi-
cal facts with natural facts. This move also undermines Sidgwick’s own 
formulation of his dualism. 
In twenty-first century philosophical vocabulary, Sidgwick is a non-
naturalist.  Ethical truth is not reducible to natural facts – not even facts 
about our desires.  Moral philosophy seeks objective facts about what we 
ought to do.  Such facts should be determinate.  In any situation, there is 
only one rational thing to do.  This is why the conflict between egoism and 
utilitarianism is so unacceptable. The gap between egoism and morality, al-
though very troubling, is also not surprising.  If ethical facts are autono-
mous, then there is no a priori reason to expect them to fit with our inter-
ests. 
Naturalists may seem to face the same dilemma as Sidgwick. However, 
they need not be so troubled by it. If ethics is a matter of purely natural 
facts, then the failure of Sidgwick's a priori procedure is not surprising.  If 
ethical facts are natural, then they can only be discovered a posteriori.  So 
the naturalist can reasonably leave it to future empirical investigation to 
decide between egoism and utilitarianism.6 
Even when mid-20th century moral philosophers did turn to normative 
ethical questions, they were often less ambitious than Sidgwick.  Normative 
ethics offers advice, teases out the implications of alternative principles, 
compares theoretical approaches, and so on.  The ambitious search for a 
single method is often replaced by a more piecemeal approach. 20th century 
                                                 
3 Darwall et al, ‘Toward Fin de siècle Ethics’. 
4 This question – dubbed the location problem by Frank Jackson – is still a central preoc-
cupation for many moral philosophers. (Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics, chapter 5.) 
5 Although emotivists and prescriptivists reject moral facts, so do confront a conflict be-
tween prudence and morality. See, for instance, Hare, Moral Thinking, sections 5.5 and 
6.2. (I owe this reference to Gianfranco Pellegrino.) 
6 Sidgwick himself discusses the possibility of an empirical reconciliation of prudence 
and morality in the concluding chapter of The Methods of Ethics. (I owe this reference to 
Gianfranco Pellegrino.) 
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metaethics undermined both Sidgwick's confidence in philosophical intu-
itionism, and his assumption that this is the only way forward for ethics. 
 
 
3.  How moral philosophy is coming back to Sidgwick 
 
All the elements of Sidgwick’s moral philosophy have made a come-back in 
the last few decades. The turning-point was Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 
1971, which re-invigorated the search for ambitious, unifying theories of 
ethics. Non-naturalism, philosophical intuitionism, and normative ethics 
are firmly back on the philosophical agenda.7 Recent analytic philosophy 
has also returned to the relationship between morality and religion.8 I shall 
argue that the questions that have replaced Sidgwick's can benefit from an-
swers analogous to his own. 
Sidgwick sees ethics as somewhat like mathematics: a respectable 
autonomous realm of fact that can be explored a priori. (By contrast, logi-
cal positivists see mathematics as analytic tautology.) Many contemporary 
ethicists also explore connections between mathematics and ethics.9 
The clash between egoism and utilitarianism remains a central ethical 
concern for contemporary utilitarian normative ethics.10 Developments in 
the world beyond philosophy, such as globalisation and climate change, 
give Sidgwick's question a new urgency by raising new conflicts between 
self and others. But Sidgwick’s answer remains ignored. 
I aim to rehabilitate that answer.  While Sidgwick’s claims about moral-
ity and immortality are too ambitious, contemporary utilitarians can learn 
from them.  We must first distinguish the metaphysical requirements of 
morality from those of theism. The metaphysical requirements of theism 
                                                 
7 For instance, consider the theist moral realism of Robert Adams, the naturalist realism 
of Richard Boyd, and (especially close to Sidgwick) the non-naturalist realism of Derek 
Parfit. (See Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods; Boyd, R., ‘Finite Beings, Finite Goods, 
Part I’; Boyd, R., ‘Finite Beings, Finite Goods, Part II’; and Parfit, ‘Appendix on Meta-
Ethics’.) 
8 See, for instance, the recent work of Robert Adams, Linda Zagzebski, and John 
Bishop. (Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods; Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory; and 
Bishop, Believing by Faith.) 
9 See T. M. Scanlon, or Robert Adams, who harks back to Leibniz, who also regarded 
both mathematics and ethics as autonomous. (Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other; Ad-
ams, Finite and Infinite Goods.) 
10 For an introduction to the current debate, see Mulgan, The Demands of Consequential-
ism, chapter one. 
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are seen most easily in its response to one famous objection – the argument 
from evil. 
 
 
4. What religion needs 
 
The argument from evil is central to the case against classical theism.  Op-
ponents argue that the evils of this world are inconsistent with the exis-
tence of an omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent God.  In reply, the theist 
appeals to freedom and immortality.  Evil is the price of human freedom, 
while an afterlife allows God to compensate the innocent victims of evil. 
Theist claims about freedom and immortality can seem metaphysically 
extravagant.  In their defence, many theists argue that morality itself 
makes similar claims.  Theism thus involves no additional extravagance.  
Most famous is Kant's moral argument. Theoretical speculation is based on 
concepts designed solely for the world of experience. It cannot take us be-
yond that world. So it cannot tell us whether God exists, or whether we are 
immortal. However, morality tells me to aim for my own moral perfection 
and for a just world. These demands are incoherent unless their goals are 
possible. But they are only possible if there is an afterlife presided over by a 
benevolent deity.  Belief in God and immortality are both practical necessi-
ties.  
Sidgwick emphatically rejected Kant’s argument. Given our need to sys-
tematise ethics, we have reason to hope that the universe is user-friendly, 
and a very strong motivation to seek evidence of friendliness, but this is no 
reason to believe that the universe actually is friendly.  We cannot simply 
assume that ethics is not incoherent. 
‘I am so far from feeling bound to believe for purposes of practice what I 
see no ground for holding as a speculative truth, that I cannot even con-
ceive the state of mind which these words seem to describe, except as a 
momentary, half-willful irrationality, committed in a violent access of phi-
losophic despair.’11 
Even if we reject the Kantian argument, a close connection between mo-
rality and religion would clearly assist theism.  (Conversely, atheists may 
regard such a connection as an argument against morality.)  I shall argue 
that religion and morality are not on a par.  Like theism, morality does re-
quire both (a certain) freedom and (something like) immortality.  But its 
requirements are much more modest. 
                                                 
11 Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Book 4, Chapter 6, p. 507. 
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5. Freedom 
 
Theist freedom needs both a certain degree, and a certain scope. Morality 
requires neither that degree, nor that scope. 
The free will defence presents evil as a necessary side-effect of human 
moral freedom.  God could only avoid evil by creating automatons.  Despite 
its evils, our world is better than any world without free agents. Contempo-
rary philosophical debate often begins with J. L. Mackie's reply.12 For any 
free agent (F) and any time (t), it is possible that F does no evil at t. It is 
thus possible, however unlikely, that F never does evil.  The same is true of 
all free agents. For any population of free agents, there is a possible world 
where those very agents never do evil.  But any perfect being will naturally 
choose that possible world.  No perfect being will ever create a free being 
who ever does evil. Yet there are free beings who choose evil. Therefore, 
there is no God. 
The now standard theist reply is due to Plantinga.13 Plantinga does not 
deny that there is a possible world where free agents never do evil, nor that 
such a possible world is better then any where evil is done.  But he denies 
that God could choose that very possible world. A free being chooses what 
to do without any outside determination.  This is what freedom is.  It thus 
makes no sense to say both that F is free, and that God chooses what F will 
do.  Suppose the Fs are a species of genuinely free being.  God can create the 
Fs, but God cannot choose between different possible worlds where the Fs 
do different things.  God can only create the Fs, and then wait and see (like 
anyone else) what they actually do.  God cannot guarantee that free agents 
never do evil. If free agency is sufficiently valuable, God will create free 
agents who might do evil. God and evil are thus not incompatible. 
Plantinga requires what I call contra divine free will (CDF). A creature has 
CDF if and only if God cannot create that creature and choose its choices.  
Let F2 be the most valuable freedom that is not contra divine. Plantinga 
must claim that a world where creatures with F2 always do the right thing 
(w1) is worse than one where creatures with CDF sometimes do the wrong 
thing (w2). 
                                                 
12 Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, chapter nine. 
13 Plantinga, God and Other Minds, chapters five and six. For a recent summary of his 
position, see Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, pp. 458-499. 
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The comparison between CDF and F2 is crucial.  The creatures in w1 do 
not lack freedom.  For all anyone knows, they may have something we 
would recognize as genuine freedom.  In the first place, it is not obvious 
that every creature with libertarian freedom must also have CDF. (Given 
our limited understanding of the metaphysics of both libertarian freewill 
and divine action, we cannot be certain that God could not control the ac-
tions of a creature with libertarian freedom.) If libertarian freedom is logi-
cally distinct from CDF, the creatures in w1 may enjoy libertarian freedom.  
On the other hand, any compatibilist freedom is clearly not CDF. (If my 
freedom is compatible with determinism, then it is also compatible with di-
vine control over my actions.) Therefore, if compatibilism is the correct ac-
count of human freedom, the creatures in w1 will have everything we value 
about our own freedom (such as moral responsibility), even without liber-
tarian freedom.14 
Let us concentrate on horrendous evils inflicted by one human being on 
another.15 Suppose x suffers horrendous evil in w2, while no-one in w1 suf-
fers any horrendous evil.  Won’t a benevolent God create w1 instead of w2, 
and spare x that evil?16 
                                                 
14 For an introduction to the recent debate on freedom, and definitions of compatibilism 
and libertarianism, see Fischer et al, Four Views on Free Will. 
15 I borrow the term ‘horrendous evil’ from Marilyn Adams. (Adams, Horrendous Evils 
and the Goodness of God.) 
16 One obvious complication is Derek Parfit’s non-identity problem.  (Parfit, Reasons and 
Persons, chapter 16.) If the differences between w1 and w2 are essential to the identity 
of particular individuals, then w2 is not worse than w1 for anyone – as everyone in w2 
would not have existed at all in w1. For ease of exposition, I put the non-identity prob-
lem to one side in the text. There are several justifications for this. First, it is obviously 
desirable for theism to avoid reliance on non-identity arguments, as any such defence of 
theism is vulnerable to attack from moral theories that can attribute moral responsibil-
ity in non-identity cases. This is especially relevant in the present case, as Parfit’s origi-
nal point was that utilitarian accounts cope comparatively well with non-identity situa-
tions. 
Second, non-identity is very unlikely to arise for God’s choices. Parfit’s original argu-
ment only claims that, as a matter of fact, I would not have existed if things had been dif-
ferent.  He admits that, for many of the factors that affect my identity, there is a possi-
ble world where I exist without that feature.  If my parents had never met, then I would 
not exist.  But there are possible worlds where I exist even though my parents never 
meet. (Perhaps my genetic material is brought together in a laboratory, or by magic.) 
We cannot bring about such worlds – but God could. 
Finally, Parfit's discussion also assumes a secular account of personal identity.  My iden-
tity depends (perhaps inter alia) on my genetic identity.  Perhaps this account could 
yield a non-identity problem for God. (If my genetic makeup somehow entails that I 
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The freewill defence concerns the freedom to inflict horrendous evils. In 
w2, this freedom must be contra divine.  Otherwise, God can prevent those 
evils. Conversely, w1 can include wide-ranging CDF – everywhere except 
when contemplating horrendous evils. Even if w1 creatures enjoy full CDF 
when choosing between competing goods, God can still ensure that w1 con-
tains no horrendous evil. 
The freedom to choose between goods is at least as valuable as freedom to 
choose between good and evil.  Even if we need some CDF, CDF to choose 
evil is redundant.  The additional freedom in w2 is an unnecessary – and 
disastrous – distraction. Indeed, choices between goods are more valuable. 
To defend this stronger claim, I present an argument that draws on the Mil-
lian utilitarian tradition, on recent work on incommensurability, on Joseph 
Raz’s work on freedom, and my own earlier work.17 
Our own lives include choices between competing goods, and between 
good and evil.  We face many non-metaphysical barriers to freedom, such 
as sanctions, threats, or imprisonment.  If these only prevent us from 
choosing evil over good, they do not impact on our morally valuable auton-
omy.  Suppose I know that inflicting horrendous evil will be severely pun-
ished.  This would not compromise my autonomy.  Inflicting evil is not 
something I need to be free to do.  By contrast, constraints that interfere 
with choices between valuable goods do reduce our well-being – sometimes 
quite severely.  In w1, moral life centres on the choice between competing 
goods. w2’s only distinctive feature is that some lives centre on the choice 
between good and evil – with some people opting for evil. The freedom en-
joyed in w2 has wider scope; but this simply is not a way that w2 is superior 
to w1 at all. 
This argument does not assume that autonomy has merely instrumental 
value. Liberal utilitarians can accord autonomy intrinsic value. What the 
argument does claim is that the intrinsic value of autonomy is found only in 
________________________________________ 
have CDF, then I could not exist without CDF.)  But alternative, non-secular, accounts 
make personal identity itself depend explicitly on God's will.  For instance, Stephen T. 
Davis suggests that the fact that God wills that a certain future person is me is sufficient 
(in the right circumstances) to make that person my future self. (Davis, Risen Indeed, p. 
119.) On this view, God cannot face a non-identity problem.  If God says that x in possi-
ble world 1 is the same as y in possible world 2, then this makes it so. Given our uncer-
tainty over personal identity, how could we ever know that God could not have brought 
it about that x, who actually has CDF, had F2 instead? 
17 Mill, Considerations on Representative Government; Mill, On Liberty; Chang, Incom-
mensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason; Raz, The Morality of Freedom; Raz, 
“Incommensurability and Agency”; Mulgan, Future People. 
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choices between competing goods. Or, to be more precise, once we have a 
choice between competing goods, then the addition of a choice between good 
and evil does not increase intrinsic value. (For the purposes of the present 
argument, we could thus remain agnostic whether a choice between good 
and evil has more intrinsic value than no choice at all.) Of course, one can 
imagine an extreme libertarian who holds that adding the choice between 
good and evil does increase intrinsic value. The liberal utilitarian rejects 
this extreme position as intuitively implausible.  
Liberal utilitarians see a shift from a focus on good and evil to a focus on 
competing goods as moral progress.  This is not naive or optimistic.  Liberal 
utilitarianism does not deny the role of evil in human life: it regards that 
role as regrettable.  W1 is better for its inhabitants than W2. A benevolent 
God has no reason to choose W2 over w1.  The horrendous evils in W2 are 
gratuitous. 
This is an explicitly liberal utilitarian argument.  It is thus not surprising 
that it finds support in Sidgwick’s moral philosophy. Sidgwick famously de-
fends a compatibilist account of freedom.18 Our freedom is perfectly com-
patible with determinism.  Sidgwick also argues that this freedom is suffi-
cient for all moral purposes.  Our lives as moral agents, our everyday deci-
sions, and our investigations as moral philosophers require the ability to 
discern, weigh up, and respond to reasons.  But this ability is fully com-
patible with our actions being ultimately determined by physical processes. 
Theists typically make three claims about freedom: 
1. The Actual claim: Human freedom is incompatibilist. 
2. The Moral claim: Morality requires incompatibilist freedom. 
3. The Value claim: The extra value of incompatibilist freedom outweighs 
the disvalue of human suffering. 
Sidgwick’s compatibilism rejects all three. Compatibilism itself is the de-
nial of the actual claim. Actual evil can be justified only by our actual free-
dom.  It is not sufficient that God might create a world containing evil.  
Theists must show that God might create this world. Sidgwick also denies 
the moral claim. Morality does not require incompatibilist freedom. It fol-
lows that theodicy is metaphysically more extravagant than morality.  Fi-
nally, Sidgwick rejects the value claim – the heart of the free will defence.  
It is not sufficient that we have incompatibilist freedom, nor even that such 
freedom is necessary for morality. Incompatibilist freedom must also out-
weigh the evils of the actual world.  Sidgwick is a hedonist.  The only ulti-
mate value is “desirable consciousness”. As a hedonist, Sidgwick places great 
                                                 
18 Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, book 1, chapter 5. 
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value on human suffering; while, as a compatibilist, he believes that com-
patibilist freedom has all the value we need. 
Although logically distinct, the three claims are obviously connected.  
Our knowledge of the value of freedom comes from introspection on our 
own lives and reflection on our morality.  If these sources only ever deal 
with compatibilist freedom, then how could we know that incompatibilist 
freedom would be so much more valuable? 
Most contemporary utilitarians follow Sidgwick’s endorsement of com-
patibilism. They see a vast gap distance between our (morally sufficient) 
freedom, and what the theist needs. But the utilitarian can also convince 
incompatibilists, by turning to the scope of freedom. Morality needs free-
dom for three distinct purposes: to hold other people morally responsible, 
we must believe their actions were freely chosen; to deliberate, I must be-
lieve that my actions are under my control; and, finally, the ability to freely 
choose one's projects is a necessary component of a valuable human life. 
Utilitarians argue that compatibilist freedom is definitely sufficient to at-
tribute moral responsibility to others. The appropriateness of such attribu-
tions depends on the consequences of praise and blame, and involves no 
deeper metaphysical commitments. This is highly significant, because only 
the attribution of moral responsibility to others could possibly concern the 
freedom to do evil.  If I am even moderately decent, then I do not seriously 
consider performing horrendous evils myself.  So my ability to deliberate 
cannot depend upon my freedom to do evil.  And we saw earlier that liberal 
utilitarians do not regard that freedom as valuable.  So I have no reason to 
think of myself as free to do evil at all.  Even if I must think of my freedom 
as CDF, I never need to ascribe evil-doing CDF to anyone.19 
I conclude that morality never needs evil-doing CDF.  Whatever morality 
does need, it needs less than theism. 
 
 
6. Immortality 
 
The freewill defence is typically combined with immortality.  Many inno-
cent people suffer horrendous evil without compensation – consider a young 
                                                 
19 We could also note that, even if I need to think of my own freedom as incompatibilist, 
it does not necessarily follow that I must think of it as contra divine.  For the purposes of 
moral deliberation, and of leading a good life, it would presumably be sufficient to be-
lieve that God could intervene in my choices, but never does. 
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child tortured to death. An afterlife makes compensation possible.20 The 
theist then argues as follows. CDF has both benefits and costs. It makes 
new goods available, but it also makes horrendous evils unavoidable by God.  
The afterlife ensures that everyone receives the benefits, and that these 
benefits are sufficient to compensate for any evils suffered in this life. Ex-
ante, everyone enjoys CDF plus the risk of horrendous evil.  Ex post, some 
get CDF plus horrendous evil, while others enjoy CDF without horrendous 
evil. x cannot complain that she has suffered horrendous evil, as she bene-
fits [perhaps post-mortem] from the features of W2 that make some evils 
unavoidable. 
Unfortunately, an afterlife is not sufficient. Theism also needs a prior life. 
A second anti-theist argument objects, not to the amount of evil in the 
world, but to its distribution.  Two features of that distribution are undesir-
able: (1) many innocent people suffer horrendous evils, while many guilty 
people enjoy very pleasant lives; and (2) suffering and pleasure are distrib-
uted very unequally with regard to many morally irrelevant characteristics 
such as gender and nationality. In short, suffering and pleasure do not track 
moral desert. 
In a just world, suffering would not be unequally distributed in morally 
irrelevant ways.  This does not mean there would be no suffering, but that 
any suffering would be distributed according to desert.  Only those who de-
served to suffer would do so. 
If we have compatibilist freedom, or indeed any freedom other than CDF, 
God can ensure that no innocent person ever suffers any horrendous evil.  If 
                                                 
20 If the afterlife is infinite in duration, or contains goods of infinite value, then it may 
seem to completely erase horrendous evil.  Suppose each finite earthly human life has a 
finite value.  While suffering can bring this value below zero, rendering the life not 
worth living, it cannot create infinite disvalue.  If we combine each earthly life with an 
afterlife of infinite positive value, then every human being enjoys an overall existence of 
infinite value.  And, most strikingly, it seems that no amount of earthly suffering has 
any negative impact on that total value.  By standard transfinite arithmetic, each infi-
nite life has the same infinite value. Contrary to initial appearances, this world’s evils do 
not make it worse for its inhabitants.  The argument from evil collapses. 
Unfortunately, this argument fails, for reasons familiar from the recent philosophical 
literature on infinite utility. (Vallentyne, and Kagan, ‘Infinite Value and Finitely Addi-
tive Value Theory’; Mulgan, ‘Transcending the Infinite Utility Debate’.) Any plausible 
aggregative principle for lives of infinite duration must meet the following condition: If 
any two lives are identical at some times, and if one is better at all times when they dif-
fer, then that life is better overall. Suppose x and y are two people who enjoy an infi-
nitely valuable afterlife. If x’s earthly life is better than y’s, then x’s overall existence is 
more valuable than y’s. 
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we have CDF, then perhaps even God cannot prevent some innocent suffer-
ing. But God will still aim to minimise undeserved suffering. This world 
contains too much innocent suffering, too unequally distributed.  We would 
not accept such unequal innocent suffering within any human society. We 
expect human rulers to be more impartial. We should expect no less from 
God. A morally perfect benevolent God would be perfectly impartial, and 
would not create a world where some fare so much better than others, 
through no merit of their own.   
The best theist reply is that things are not as they seem. Imagine two 
otherwise identical worlds: Rebirth and Single Life.  In each, many people 
suffer in ways that cannot be justified given their behaviour in this lifetime.  
The difference between the two worlds is this. In Single Life, each individ-
ual lives only once; while in Rebirth, the same individual is reborn many 
times, and one’s fate in each life depends on one’s actions in previous lives. 
In Rebirth, all suffering is deserved. 
Rebirth is more just than Single Life.  And there is no other morally sig-
nificant difference – as both worlds contain the same aggregate welfare, the 
same average welfare, and exactly the same distribution of welfare at any 
one time. If desert has any value, then Rebirth is better.  Any God choosing 
between these two worlds will prefer Rebirth. 
These two possible worlds are two interpretations of our actual world.  If 
God created the world, and if rebirth is possible, then we are living in Re-
birth. There are only three possibilities: either rebirth is actual; or rebirth is 
logically impossible; or God does not exist. If rebirth is logically possible 
but not actual, then God does not exist.  Theists must either defend the cy-
cle of rebirth, or argue that it is logically impossible. 
If rebirth is not possible, then God could provide a different afterlife. 
However, liberal utilitarians will argue instead that God would prefer not to 
create any human beings at all. Without rebirth, our world is simply too 
unjust. God would prefer creatures who never perform evil. God would cre-
ate w1 instead of w2. Theism must defend the logical possibility of rebirth. 
The argument that a just God would favour rebirth is not unprecedented. 
It can be found in all cultures where belief in rebirth is common. Nor is it 
unknown in the Western theist tradition – belief in reincarnation was one of 
the heresies attributed to Origen in the third century AD.21 However, hav-
                                                 
21 Origen is also associated with universalism – the view that everyone (even the Devil) 
will eventually be saved. In fact, it seems likely that, while the accusation of universal-
ism is just, Origen himself did not embrace reincarnation. The claim that he did is more 
likely to have been an attempt to discredit his views by association with aspects of con-
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ing been declared a heresy, the rebirth view fell out of favour in our phi-
losophical tradition. I argue that, in light of modern liberal utilitarian val-
ues, the time has come to reconsider that decision.22 
 
 
7. Is Rebirth possible? 
 
We begin with objections to the metaphysical coherence of rebirth (section 
7), and then consider objections to a perfectly just mechanism of rebirth 
(section 8). 
The possibility of rebirth depends on the nature of personal identity – one 
of the most contentious of philosophical topics. Consider two diametrically 
opposed positions. On a bodily criterion, personal identity across time re-
quires continuity of bodily identity. It is therefore simply impossible for the 
same person to be reborn in different bodies. Personal survival of death re-
quires the physical resurrection of the body – as in the traditional Christian 
view.23 At the other extreme, on a dualist criterion, personal identity re-
quires continuity of spiritual identity, where the soul is distinct from the 
body. There is then no reason why the same person cannot be reborn in dif-
ferent bodies. Dualism does not guarantee rebirth – or even immortality. 
God could simply destroy our souls at death. But dualism does mean than 
________________________________________ 
temporary paganism considered disreputable by third-century Christians.  (Edwards, 
Origen Against Plato.) 
22 Commenting on an earlier draft of this paper, Gianfranco Pellegrino raises the follow-
ing problem for my argument that a cycle of rebirth could render our world just. One 
crucial claim in my argument is that rebirth makes it possible that seemingly unde-
served suffering is actually deserved due to one’s action in a previous life. Any cycle of 
rebirth must be either infinite or finite.  Yet an infinite cycle of rebirth requires infinite 
past time, which is hard to reconcile with the doctrine of divine creation; while a finite 
cycle of rebirth implies a first life, where any suffering will still be undeserved. There are 
two main replies available to the theist. (1) If we adopt the view that God is outside 
time, then it may be possible for God to be the creator of a universe with an infinite 
past. (2) Theists could accept a first life, and argue that, as a matter of fact, there was no 
suffering in that life. All suffering occurred in later lives, as a result of misbehaviour in 
the first life. If this is a possible situation, then it must be what God has created. Noth-
ing we observe in our lives can prove that the first life was not like this. (Whether they 
are true or not, myths of a fall from paradise are not logically incoherent.) 
Finally, I would note that my dialectical purpose is to raise difficulties for theism. If the 
supposition that this world is just requires an infinite cycle of rebirth, and if theism is 
inconsistent with such a cycle, then theism is inconsistent with the supposition that this 
world is just. 
23 Van Inwagen, ‘The Possibility of Resurrection’. 
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rebirth for human beings is one of God’s options. Given our earlier argu-
ment, this is sufficient to establish that God would take that option. 
Another currently popular view that also seems to rule out rebirth is the 
no-self view of Derek Parfit.24  On this view, there is no self that continues 
from moment to moment. It thus seems obvious that there is no self that 
could survive death.  We might be drawn to the no-self view by a dualist er-
ror theory.  Suppose we believe that personal identity requires a soul with 
‘inherent existence’ (in the Buddhist phrase).  Finding no such soul, we 
conclude that there is no personal identity. 
Despite appearances, Parfit’s view does not automatically rule out re-
birth. We must separate eliminativism (there are no persons) from reduction-
ism (personal identity is reducible to, and no more valuable than, its con-
stituent relations).  Eliminativism rules out rebirth.  But it also rejects per-
sonal identity within this life.  This is very radically metaphysically revi-
sionist.  To avoid radical moral revisionism, eliminativists must adopt fic-
tionalism about persons – for moral purposes, we talk as if there were per-
sons, despite knowing that there are no persons. But we can then apply the 
same solution to rebirth.  To take one striking example, even the most 
eliminativist Buddhist continues to speak of rebirth at the level of conven-
tional truth – even while recognising the ultimate truth that there are no 
persons to be reborn. 
By contrast, reductionism allows rebirth as an ultimate truth, and not 
merely a conventional one. Rebirth, like personal continuity within a life, 
can occur through memory or psychological continuity – without a separate 
entity that continues from one life to another.  However, reductionism does 
create problems for our overall argument.  Parfit’s main point is that, be-
cause reductionism is true, personal identity is less morally significant than 
we are inclined to believe. If the identity of persons is nothing over-and-
above certain physical or psychological relations, then it cannot be more 
important than those underlying relations. Reductionism leads to moral re-
visions, often in the direction of utilitarianism. Reductionism limits the 
moral significance of personal compensation and individual responsibility. 
It thus reduces the force of the argument from evil, and lessens the rele-
vance of rebirth. (We return to this aspect of reductionism in the final sec-
tion, where I argue that it supports our utilitarian alternative to rebirth.)  
We cannot use an account of personal identity to settle the controversy 
over rebirth, for three reasons. The first is that personal identity is highly 
                                                 
24 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, part three. This view is also associated with David Hume, 
and is found in many varieties of Buddhism. 
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controversial – so our account of rebirth will simply inherit that contro-
versy. The second is that the correct account of personal identity depends 
upon facts about human beings. Proponents of rebirth often treat human 
rebirth as a datum, and thus seek an account of personal identity consistent 
with that ‘fact’; while opponents, citing the ‘datum’ that humans are not 
reborn, may prefer a different account. Finally, our preferred account of 
personal identity may depend upon whether or not we believe in God. (For 
instance, some theists argue that the will of God can provide the mysterious 
‘further fact’ that Parfit finds lacking in all non-reductionist accounts of 
personal identity.25) But, obviously enough, any attempt to use the result-
ing account of personal identity as a premise in an argument for or against 
the existence of God will result in circularity. 
It seems that we have reached an impasse. However, we must recall our 
dialectical context. We are not asking whether rebirth is possible for us. We 
are asking whether there are any possible free creatures for whom rebirth is 
possible. If any account of personal identity consistent with rebirth is con-
ceptually coherent, then we can imagine creatures for whom personal conti-
nuity is consistent with rebirth. And it seems that, whatever the truth re-
garding humans, dualist and reductionist accounts are coherent. Therefore, 
God could have created free reborn creatures. If we also believe that we are 
not such creatures, then this strengthens our objection to theism. 
Consider a more modest objection to rebirth: that, whatever its concep-
tual coherence, rebirth is a not a plausible interpretation of this world. This 
argument appeals to the popular idea that memory is necessary for personal 
identity. If so, then, even if we are reborn, our rebirth typically does not 
preserve identity, as most people do not remember their past lives.  Rebirth 
would then provide no personal survival beyond death.  Alternatively, if we 
defend personal identity without memory – perhaps by appeal to an imma-
terial soul – we must then ask why personal identity without memory is 
valuable. 26  Can survival without memory offer compensation and punish-
ment?  
In our dialectical context, this argument against rebirth counts against 
theism. It suggests that, while logically possible, rebirth is not an epistemic 
                                                 
25 Davis, Risen Indeed, p. 119. 
26 The defender of rebirth might also replace memory with psychological continuity – and 
then argue that this continuity could be subconscious.  Perhaps my character develops 
through time even though I have no memory.  Consider the relevance of my early years, 
of which I now have no memory, to my moral character. But this still leaves the evalua-
tive questions. Is psychological continuity without memory valuable? Is it a suitable 
basis for desert? 
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possibility when applied to human beings. God could have made reborn 
creatures, but did not. Both theists and proponents of rebirth must reject 
this argument. One option is as follows.  Perhaps memories of past lives are 
recovered in some future life.  Consider the following model.27 An individual 
goes through a long series of lives (L1, L2, L3, …., Ln).  In the final life 
(Ln), all previous lives are remembered.  Earlier lives are analogous to a se-
ries of dreams: each unrelated to the others, but all remembered by the sin-
gle waking self.  (This metaphor is especially apt within an Idealist, Bud-
dhist, or Neoplatonic metaphysical scheme, where our final state is akin to 
waking from the dream of our earthly life.) The fact that some individuals 
do claim reliable memory of past lives is then evidence in favour of rebirth; 
while the fact that most people do not remember any past lives does not 
count against rebirth. This model seems to provide enough personal conti-
nuity to ground moral responsibility across lives. And, for all anyone 
knows, it is the model God has chosen. 
I conclude both that rebirth is an option for a just God, and that, for all 
anyone knows, this is the option God has chosen. Not only might there be 
creatures who are reborn; but we also cannot be sure that we are not such 
creatures. 
 
 
8. Does rebirth guarantee justice? 
 
Suppose the theist concedes that rebirth is possible. They might still reject 
rebirth, by denying that it provides a just world. Our question was why bad 
things happen to good people. Rebirth offers the best reply: they do not.  
However, only perfectly ethicised rebirth can play this role – and this is in-
consistent with CDF. 
I borrow the distinction between ethicised and non-ethicised rebirth from 
Obeyasekere.28 Historically, non-ethicised rebirth usually comes first. The 
cycle of rebirth is seem as a natural phenomenon. While it may be influ-
enced by human action, it is not itself a moral process. In ethicised rebirth, 
by contrast, rebirth tracks desert. Ethicised rebirth can guarantee that 
people get what they deserve in the next life.  Non-ethicised rebirth makes 
                                                 
27 This model is drawn from McTaggart and other idealists, and is also the traditional 
Buddhist model of the life history of a Buddha or Arahant. (McTaggart, Some Dogmas of 
Religion; Williams, Mahayana Buddhism.) 
28 Obeyesekere, Imagining Karma. 
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this staggeringly unlikely. A perfectly just world requires ethicised re-
birth.29 
Suppose human beings have CDF. Suppose, also, for the sake of an argu-
ment by reductio ad absurdum, that the mechanism of rebirth is perfectly 
ethicised. If the rebirth mechanism is perfectly ethicised, then it must en-
sure that I get what I deserve in this life. My fate in this life depends, in 
part, on the actions of other human beings. So the rebirth mechanism must 
be based on perfect predictions of the actions of others. But, if such predic-
tions are possible, then God, who is omniscient and omnipotent, could also 
make them. But this contradicts our assumption that humans have CDF. 
So the mechanism of rebirth cannot be perfectly ethicised. 
Compatibilists, such as Sidgwick, will reject this argument simply by re-
jecting CDF. Even if we accept CDF, however, the argument still fails. 
CDF may rule out a perfectly ethicised system of rebirth. But partially ethi-
cised rebirth mechanisms are still available. Even we, with our very limited 
knowledge, can make some predictions about an individual’s fate in this 
world. We know, for instance, that someone born into a lower-caste family 
in a poor region of India has fewer life chances than someone born into af-
fluence in the West. Presumably God can make many more predictions. 
The most just world consistent with CDF will be governed by a rebirth 
mechanism that is as ethicised as possible. Even if it is not perfectly just, 
this would be much more just than any world without rebirth. 
Indeed, even non-ethicised rebirth might well be more just than a world 
where each person has only one life. If we believe in non-ethicised rebirth, 
then it is no longer tragic for a child to die young, as her short life is only 
one part of the individual's much longer journey.  If every soul goes 
through a similar series of lives, some of them brief, then this individual’s 
entire existence is no longer tragic in comparison to the total existence of 
others. Rebirth also allows loved ones to meet again in another life.30 Death 
                                                 
29 If the rebirth mechanism is perfectly ethicised, then we have a perfect theodicy with-
out God.  Indeed, God’s only role is to act as an infallible mechanism for perfectly ethi-
cised rebirth.  If God makes choices independent of the individual’s ethical merits, then 
this introduces an element of arbitrariness and unfairness. 
30 This particular role for rebirth can only be played by rebirth within the kin group, or 
some other system where friends in one life find each other anew in each rebirth (or at 
least in some future rebirth). Most systems of non-ethicised rebirth that have been 
adopted in human history have involved rebirth within the kin group – suggesting that, 
even when it is non-ethicised, one key role of belief in rebirth has always been to make 
the world seem more just. 
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thus loses much of its sting. As a result, the fact that innocent people are 
murdered becomes less unjust. 
 
 
9. Immortality and Morality 
 
We now compare the requirements of theism with those of morality.  As 
with freedom, we distinguish both a scope and a mechanism.  Theism re-
quires a perfectly ethicised cycle of rebirth; or, if CDF makes perfection im-
possible, a maximally ethicised cycle.  With regard to scope, that cycle must 
include all human lives – past, present, and future. A morally perfect God 
will create a world that not only is just, but has always been just. 
It may seem obvious that morality requires much less.  After all, rebirth 
is hardly a common view in Western culture.  Many people continue to be-
lieve in morality, and to act relatively morally, without any belief in an af-
terlife whatsoever.  The fact that belief in non-ethicised rebirth, itself insuf-
ficient for a just world, is found in many cultures reinforces the conclusion 
that human beings can live indefinitely within an unjust cosmos. 
I agree that morality requires much less than theism in terms of both 
scope and mechanism.  However, I shall also argue that morality does re-
quire some belief akin to immortality. 
 
 
10. Separating Morality from Theism 
 
I begin by dispensing with some familiar arguments that attempt to tie mo-
rality to theism. If morality requires us to believe in God, and if we cannot 
believe in God without an afterlife, then morality requires that afterlife.  
Morality might require God for three reasons. (1)  If some relationship with 
the divine is a necessary condition for a meaningful human life, then the 
moral need to think of our own lives as meaningful requires belief in God. 
(2) Alternatively, if we can only behave morally in a world we believe to be 
just, and if God is necessary to guarantee justice, then we must posit God. 
(3) Finally, God might be necessary to ground moral truths. 
All three arguments are vulnerable. Even if we agree that human lives 
would be more valuable if God existed, it does not follow that the values 
available in an atheist world are insufficient. Utilitarians will simply reply 
that the avoidance of suffering and the cultivation of the most valuable 
human experiences, achievements, and relationships are sufficient for a 
meaningful human moral life. 
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As we saw earlier, a perfectly just Godless world is possible, if some im-
personal mechanism generates an ethicised cycle of rebirth. So justice does 
not require God. I would also argue that morality does not require the 
world to be perfectly just. We return to that question below. 
Finally, God is not needed to ground moral truths.  This argument for 
theism does have some force in relation to non-naturalists such as Sidgwick, 
who cannot base morality on either natural facts or human inclinations.  
Without God, the non-naturalist seems to leave moral facts hanging in thin 
air.  Contemporary non-naturalists will offer two replies: one negative, the 
other positive.  The negative reply notes that God faces the same problems 
as any naturalist foundation for morality – a point familiar from both 
Plato's Euthyphro dilemma and G. E. Moore’s ‘naturalistic fallacy’.  Just 
as we can always ask, of any natural property, whether actions with that 
property are right; so we can ask whether God's commands are right, or the 
things that God loves are good.  The appeal of non-naturalism rests on the 
implausibility of any foundation for moral claims, whether natural or su-
pernatural. 
The positive defence of non-naturalism would appeal to analogies with 
other areas of knowledge. The autonomy of different realms of discourse is a 
striking theme of recent philosophy.  We accept knowledge of mathematics, 
logic, and other minds that cannot be reduced to, or derived from, knowl-
edge of any other domain.  Why not grant non-natural moral facts the same 
autonomy? 
 
 
11. Separating morality from justice: Scope 
 
Suppose we accept, as many contemporary philosophers do, that morality 
can survive without God.  Our present question is whether it can survive 
without some kind of afterlife. A believer in perfectly ethicised rebirth 
might argue that, even if morality does not require God, it does require a 
perfectly just world. We saw earlier that a perfectly just world requires per-
fectly ethicised rebirth. So morality requires the same.  
Utilitarians, like many others, will simply deny that morality presup-
poses a completely just world. Morality is essentially forward-looking. It re-
lates to our impact on the world. We can affect the future, but not the past. 
What matters is what the future holds, not the past. So morality cannot re-
quire a belief that the world has been just. Indeed, utilitarians will be very 
suspicious of that belief. If it turns out to be false, it will have a very nega-
tive impact. (The following argument draws on a long utilitarian tradition – 
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especially associated with Jeremy Bentham – of rejecting conservative de-
fences of the status quo.) 
If we believe in ethicised rebirth, then we will also believe that the less 
fortunate deserve their misfortunes, and thus deserve no assistance.  If ethi-
cised rebirth is not true, then our false beliefs will lead us to fail to assist in-
nocent victims of injustice. False belief in ethicised rebirth illegitimately re-
duces concern for the least fortunate. 
If the metaphysical case for rebirth is compelling, then of course we 
should believe it. But the rebirth story is under-supported by evidence and 
argument.31 (Even if rebirth per se is well-supported, belief in ethicised re-
birth is certainly a leap of faith.) If we believe in rebirth, we definitely do so 
for moral reasons. Utilitarians will then argue that, for well-off people to 
believe, without sufficient evidence, that they ‘deserve’ their good fortune 
on account of virtuous past lives – while others deserve to suffer – is an ex-
treme case of objectionable partiality. 
Theism and morality have very different scopes.  Theism must apply its 
cycle of rebirth to the past as well as the future, because a just cosmos con-
cerns both past and future. On the other hand, for the utilitarian, morality 
is essentially forward-looking. 
 
 
12. Separating morality from justice: Mechanism 
 
Morality does not require the same scope of immortality as theism.  But 
perhaps it requires the same mechanism, with a more limited scope.  Here 
are three familiar moral arguments for immortality: 
1. The justice argument. Morality tells us to play our part in making the 
world just. We cannot adopt a goal unless we know that goal will be 
achieved. Therefore, we must believe that the world will become just. 
2. The Sidgwick argument.  Morality only makes sense if there is a perfect 
correlation between self-interest and aggregate well-being.  Such a coinci-
dence is only possible with an afterlife. Therefore, morality requires an af-
terlife. 
3. The meaningfulness argument.  My life can only be meaningful if I have 
some chance of achieving some goal that can only be achieved if I survive 
death. 
                                                 
31 For a philosophical critique of arguments and evidence for rebirth, see Edwards, Rein-
carnation. 
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All three arguments are forward-looking.  But they demand different 
mechanisms.  The justice argument is the most demanding.  It requires a 
perfectly ethicised cycle of rebirth (or something equivalent) in the future.  
It is also the least persuasive argument, with two obvious weaknesses. In 
the first place, my goal as an individual is not a just world – something I 
cannot bring about – but merely to play my part in bringing about such a 
world. I can play that part even if I know that, because others will not play 
theirs, the world is unlikely to become just. Rule utilitarians have long ac-
knowledged the distinction between an ideal code (based on an ideal world 
of full compliance) and moral guidance for the real world of partial compli-
ance. The non-compliance of others is a serious moral issue, but we do not 
solve it by wishing it away.32 
Furthermore, to adopt something as my goal, I clearly do not need to be-
lieve that it will come about. Indeed, if I already believe that, then it makes 
no sense to adopt the goal. If success is inevitable, then morality is irrele-
vant. The most that I must believe is that the goal is possible. If a just 
world is my goal, it is enough to believe that such a world is possible – how-
ever unlikely. If I have the more limited of playing my part in a just world, 
then I only need to believe that it is possible that my actions will make the 
world more just. 
I conclude that the justice argument fails. We turn next to the Sidgwick 
argument. This  requires only a correlation between self-interest and moral-
ity in the future. It does not require a just world. Indeed, the Sidgwick cor-
relation is possible even in a world that always remains unjust. The Sidg-
wick correlation does not require that the good always prosper; only that 
some mechanism ensures that the rewards for each individual of behaving 
morally – whatever those rewards may be – are equal to her rewards from 
self-interested behaviour. It might turn out that I will suffer whatever I do, 
while you will prosper. What matters is that I do best by doing my duty, 
not that I do well. 
The Sidgwick correlation clearly does not apply to this life. In this life, 
self-interest and morality clearly point in different directions. An afterlife 
can align them. So Sidgwick requires an afterlife. But he does not need an 
immortal afterlife, or an eternal cycle of rebirth. A perfect correlation could 
be achieved in a single next life – where any rewards from immorality in 
this life (and losses from moral behaviour) are counter-balanced.  
                                                 
32 On contemporary rule utilitarianism, see Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World; Mulgan, The 
Demands of Consequentialism, chapter three; and Mulgan, Future People, chapter five. 
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So the Sidgwick correlation requires some afterlife, even if it needs much 
less than theism. But does morality require the Sidgwick correlation? Most 
contemporary utilitarians would say that it does not. Utilitarians regard 
the clash between self-interest and aggregate well-being as a site of real 
moral conflict. Our moral lives are structured by the clash between these 
two conflicting sources of moral demand. While it is difficult to resolve that 
conflict, it is not impossible. A central question for utilitarians is the extent 
to which morality requires me to sacrifice my own well-being for the com-
mon good. Such sacrifice is morally problematic because, in our world, it so 
often seems to be uncompensated. In a world with a Sidgwick correlation, 
while the concept of self-sacrifice may make sense, uncompensated sacrifice 
is ruled out.33 
A Sidgwick correlation is not necessary for morality, and would indeed 
render our moral lives rather empty. Modern utilitarianism offers many 
more realistic ways to balance self-interest and aggregate well-being. How-
ever, although Sidgwick’s correlation is unnecessary, his argument does un-
cover a real issue for utilitarian ethics.  If the gap between self-interest and 
aggregate well-being grows too large, then any recognisably utilitarian 
moral code may become too demanding for ordinary human beings.  Ac-
cordingly, utilitarians have an urgent need to seek ways to bring self-
interest and aggregate well-being closer together.  I shall argue that concern 
for future people can play this role. 
We turn now to our third moral argument for immortality. The meaning-
fulness argument is most famously associated with Kant. Morality gives me 
                                                 
33 This is also why utilitarians have strong reason to reject recent philosophical at-
tempts, such as that of David Gauthier, to reduce morality to self-interested rationality. 
(Gauthier, Morals by Agreement.) 
We should also note that the existence of a Sidgwick correlation would not necessarily 
resolve any of our practical difficulties. Faced with an apparent conflict between self-
interest and aggregate well-being, I must decide what to do. Sidgwick tells me that the 
conflict is only apparent, as some unkown mechanism ensures that self-interest and ag-
gregate well-being coincide. This does not, in itself, help me decide what to do. Should I 
do what self-interest seems to recommend, or what aggregate well-being seems to rec-
ommend? Commentators typically assume that the mechanism works by adjusting post-
mortem individual rewards so that the action recommended by utilitarianism in this life 
also maximises self-interest. But, of course, an opposite mechanism is equally possible. 
Perhaps we should all pursue our own self-interest – and trust that a utilitarian afterlife 
will ensure that our egoism maximises aggregate well-being. (In much the same way 
that many of our contemporaries trust in the mechanisms of the free-market to conjure 
maximum aggregate well-being out of self-interest.) If our aim is to decide what to do, 
then positing a Sidgwick correlation does not help. 
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the goal of perfect virtue. As perfect virtue is only possible if I am immor-
tal, I must adopt the postulate of immortality. As it stands, this argument 
is over-stated. I can surely adopt perfect virtue as the goal around which I 
structure my life, while still acknowledging that I cannot ever reach that 
goal. This move is especially congenial to utilitarians, who urge me to adopt 
utility maximisation as my ethical standard, without claiming that I could 
ever actually maximise utility. 
However, like Sidgwick’s dualism, Kant’s argument also points to a 
deeper moral issue. If we are to live morally meaningful lives, then we do 
need something to play the role that immortality plays for Kant or Sidg-
wick.  But a secular concern for future people is sufficient here as well.  
 
 
13. Separating future concern from self-concern 
 
Among both philosophers and non-philosophers, opinion divides sharply 
over the meaningfulness question. This division often tracks the divide be-
tween atheists and theists. Of course, atheists and theists disagree over 
whether they will survive death.  But they also disagree over two evalua-
tive questions.  Would it be good to survive death?  And especially: Is life 
meaningless or empty if we do not?  Many people find it liberating to think 
that this life is all we have.  This gives our present life a new meaning and 
urgency.  Others find such a prospect intolerable.  The former tend to be 
atheists; the latter theists. Of course, we could see both reactions as ration-
alisations.  If you are convinced that this world is all there is, then you 
might want to look on the bright side; while someone who has devoted their 
life to the search for posthumous salvation will hardly cherish the prospect 
that this was unnecessary.  But I propose to take these conflicting attitudes 
at face value. 
My own attitude is mixed. I believe that the absence of an afterlife would 
not – and, indeed, does not – deprive life of its meaning.  But, on the other 
hand, insofar as life is good I would like it to continue, and I certainly do 
not feel the force of the currently fashionable idea that an eternal life must 
be eventually meaningless.34 And, most significantly for our present discus-
sion, I believe that we must look beyond our own immediate interests and 
concerns – and perhaps beyond the boundaries of our own individual 
earthly life – to find true meaning. 
                                                 
34 Williams, “The Makropolous Case”. 
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Not everyone shares this last belief. But my present aim is to show that 
even those who do share it, need not posit rebirth or any other afterlife. In 
the meaningfulness argument, immortality plays two roles. It provides con-
tinuity of both moral agent and moral object. In Kant’s original example, the 
two are merged, as my principal moral object is my own moral agency. 
Suppose I know that, whatever I do, I will be annihilated immediately after 
my next action. This fact might render my final choice meaningless, in two 
distinct ways. If the objects of my moral concern do not extend beyond my 
own life, then I will be indifferent to the results of my final action. Alterna-
tively, I may feel unable to embark on any course of action at all – on the 
grounds that actions require agency extended over time, and my agency is 
about to end. 
Drawing together our discussions of both Sidgwick and meaningfulness, I 
suggest that immortality can play three useful roles in moral philosophy. 
Immortality can provide each of the following: (1) continuity of moral 
agent; (2) continuity of moral object; and (3) reconciliation of self-interest 
and aggregate well-being. 
Any form of afterlife provides for continuity of both agent and object. If 
I will live again, then, at any point in this life, my agency stretches into the 
future. Even if my moral concern is only for myself, its object is also on-
going.35 However, no form of immortality offers a satisfactory reconcilia-
tion. Ethicised rebirth (or ethicised personal immortality) reconciles self-
interest and utilitarian morality. However, because that reconciliation is 
perfect, it achieves too much – depriving our ethical lives of their richness 
and moral content. 
Non-ethicised rebirth also provides continuity of both agent and object. 
Continuity is ensured by rebirth itself, not by its mechanism. So long as I 
will be reborn, both my agency and my self-concern continue. However, 
non-ethicised rebirth, or any other form of non-ethicised personal immortal-
ity, does nothing to reconcile self-interest and aggregate well-being.  In-
deed, it inhibits such reconciliation.  By ensuring continuity of the individ-
                                                 
35 A finite cycle of rebirth may seem insufficient. If each life is similar, then I will face 
the threat of meaninglessness in my last life. However, if change or progress is possible 
from one life to another, then, while this life might require a next life to render it fully 
meaningful, we cannot assume that this requirement holds true of all future lives.  
Things might be different in the next life in ways that we cannot now predict, even if 
the next life is also finite in duration.  The fact that today needs tomorrow to render to-
day's projects meaningful, does not imply that I must live for ever if each day’s projects 
are to make sense. 
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ual agent, non-ethicised rebirth allows for purely self-concerned continuity 
of object. 
By contrast, if we reject a personal afterlife, we must also reject the pos-
sibility of continuity for the individual agent. We must then seek alterna-
tive objects of moral concern.  And, as we shall now see, this very search it-
self inevitably leads to a partial reconciliation between self-interest and ag-
gregate well-being. 
Suppose I am convinced that I will not survive death.  This threatens to 
make my life meaningless, especially as I approach the moment of my 
death.  How can I ensure continuity of both moral agent and moral con-
cern?  To explore this question, let us begin with a more extreme case.  
Suppose I become convinced of the no-self view, advocated by Parfit and 
Buddhism.  I see my present self, not as a continuing agent who exists 
through time, but as a momentarily existing atom of experience.  ‘I’ consist 
only of this present choice.  How can I make that choice meaningful? 
If I remain self-concerned, and self-focused, my search for meaning will 
be fruitless.  As I cease to exist the moment this choice is made, it can nei-
ther affect me in the future, nor form part of any meaningful ongoing pat-
tern of action that I perform. 
The contemporary Kantian moral philosopher Christine Korsgaard pre-
sents the need for agent continuity as a conclusive practical reason to reject 
the reductionist no-self account of personal identity. The fact that we can 
do metaphysics without supposing deep further facts about the identity of 
persons does not mean that ethics can afford to be equally parsimonious. To 
deliberate, one must see oneself as a unified conscious agent whose projects 
and identity endure through time.36 
Korsgaard’s Kantian argument for a continuing self is strikingly analo-
gous to the Kantian argument for personal immortality.  I shall argue that 
the best reductionist reply to the former provides the best utilitarian reply 
to the latter. 
Suppose that, despite Korsgaard's argument, I remain in the metaphysi-
cal grip of the no-self view.  I cannot believe in a continuing self.  But I ac-
cept the need to think of my present decision as a part of some larger pat-
tern of actions, performed by some agent larger than my (present, momen-
tary) self.  How might I proceed? 
The obvious solution is to think, not in terms of individual agents, but of 
groups.  My present self and my future selves, though not strictly one per-
                                                 
36 Korsgaard, “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency”. For related discussion, see 
Mulgan, “Two Parfit Puzzles” and Mulgan, Future People, chapter 3. 
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son, are still a group of agents acting in concert.  Instead of focusing on 
what I can do, and then being paralysed by my own limitations, I should in-
stead begin by asking what we can do together. I then choose my action, not 
in isolation, but because of the role it plays in some larger collective pattern 
of action. 
The advantage of group action is that it is much more metaphysically 
parsimonious in this context than individual agency. I can believe that my 
present and future selves act as a group even if I am sceptical about the 
precise metaphysical status of that group. Consider the more familiar case 
of a group made up of different persons, such as a department or nation. I 
can easily believe that my department acts as a group without believing 
that there exists some metaphysically distinct agent that is the department. 
This metaphysical parsimony is especially useful in the parallel case of 
immortality.  Suppose I very strongly do not believe in personal immortal-
ity or rebirth.  I simply cannot believe that I will survive death. Indeed, 
perhaps I cannot even entertain that belief as a ‘postulate of practical rea-
son’ – whatever that means. But I am convinced that meaningfulness re-
quires continuity of agency beyond my death.  I cannot really believe that 
there are future selves who are continuations of my present self.  But I do 
believe there are future people, distinct from myself, with whom I can join 
in group action.  Instead of thinking of my present action in isolation, and 
despairing over the limitations imposed by my mortality, I should think of 
that group, and then ask what we can do together.  I then play my part in 
our best group action. 
These remarks apply to continuity of agency.  This is the more difficult, 
and more controversial, case.  Continuity of moral object is easier to 
achieve.  Under the no-self view, as an isolated instantaneous self, I can 
only achieve meaning by caring about future selves who are not me.  As a 
mortal person who rejects personal immortality, I can only achieve mean-
ing by caring about future people who are not me.  Continuity of agency 
obviously supports continuity of object.  Once I start to evaluate my ac-
tions by considering their part in a larger group action, I am likely to begin 
to identify with that group, and with its other members – adopting their 
concerns as my own. 
This brings us to a second advantage of the group action path to mean-
ing. Unlike the solution offered by non-ethicised rebirth, it provides a par-
tial Sidgwick correlation.  To make my life meaningful, I must think more 
about larger wholes, and less about my individual self.  This brings my self-
concern closer to aggregate well-being.  The reconciliation is never total.  
The groups in question are smaller than the whole of humanity, and my 
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identification with them is never absolute.  The conflict between self-
interest and aggregate well-being remains.  But this is as it should be, if our 
reconciliation is not to obliterate the essence of human moral life. 
Group action is hardly uncontroversial, and raises more questions than it 
answers.37 But it does provide a metaphysically parsimonious alternative to 
both Kant's moral argument for immortality, and Sidgwick's own solution 
to his dualism of practical reason.  It also highlights the comparative mod-
esty of morality, as against the metaphysical extravagance of theism. 
As obligations to future people become more pressing in our ethical lives, 
and as ethical issues become more globalised and interconnected, group ac-
tions will become ever more significant.38 This makes our ethical lives more 
complicated, and can make individuals feel insignificant.  I have argued 
that, on the contrary, group action is the key to a meaningful ethical life. 
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